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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a discussion about some recent issues related to the transfer of 
credit risk (CRT) from the perspective of global liquidity. The CRT market is enor-
mously growing and exhibits major structural shifts in terms of buyers and sellers of 
protection. I try to address these issues from an options perspective by suggesting 
that liquidity providing can be understood, in economic terms, as selling put options. 
The overall conclusion of the paper is that it is not the extent of CRT per se, as often 
claimed, which causes liquidity related systemic risk, but rather the potential coordi-
nation failures of the behavior market participants in adverse market environments. In 
this context, I critically address the role of investments banks in providing liquidity to 
hedge funds, and finally, the (limited) access of global banks to central bank liquidity 
through cross-border collateral trading. – Since coordination failures, seen as the ma-
jor issue of a potential liquidity crisis, is to a large extent a matter of market structure, 
regulatory actions to improve liquidity should focus on the architecture of the financial 
system in the first place, not so much on the behavior of individual agents. Market 
stabilization should therefore be understood as a process of establishing informative 
markets and adequate infrastructure.  
 
*heinz.zimmermann@unibas.ch 
Holbeinstrasse 12 
CH 4051 Basel 
 
 
I would like to thank Peter Nobel, Yvan Lengwiler and Yvonne Seiler for helpful dis-
cussions in preparing this paper. Geoffrey P. Miller added interesting and substantial 
comments as discussant at the Conference. They are not included in the present 
draft, but added as a separate contribution to this volume (???). 
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1. Motivation of this paper 
 
This paper should not be understood as an original academic 
contribution to the highly controversial topic of credit securitiza-
tion, credit derivatives, its impact on systemic risk, financial sta-
bility and regulation. It is rather a review of several aspects of 
the current discussion from the perspective of global liquidity. I 
also try to review some of the relevant academic papers.  
 
This perspective contrasts somehow the current discussion 
which strongly focuses on risk issues, such as risk transfer, risk 
measurement, disclosure, regulation – at least at first-sight. 
However, when it comes to asses the potential disruption of the 
market, or systemic issues, the discussion comes quickly down 
to “liquidity” issues, as the examples reproduced in the Appen-
dix demonstrate.  
 
Given its apparent importance, both in terms of financial stability 
and potential regulation, it is interesting to observe that there is 
neither a consistent terminology, nor a consistent framework to 
analyze liquidity issues. I try to address the issue from an op-
tions perspective by suggesting that liquidity providing is, in 
economic terms, the same as selling put options. This equiva-
lence is motivated – although not explicitly proposed – by 
Grossman [1988] in the context of the equity market crash of 
1987, and Scholes [2000] in discussing the near-collapse of 
LTCM.  
 
I think that this provides a useful framework for addressing li-
quidity issues in general, and in particular, provides important 
insights when analyzing the credit risk transfer (CRT) markets 
and the role of investment banks, hedge funds, central banks, 
and other participants. Of course, these thoughts are prelimi-
nary and critical comments are welcome.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I 
shortly address the basic terminology related to CRT, and pro-
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vide some figures. Sections 3 and 4 show how the provision of 
liquidity, and the selling of insurance, is related to writing put op-
tions. In Sections 5 and 6 I analyze the economic function of 
CRT markets, particularly the problems related to over-the-
counter products. Section 7 reviews some recent figures about 
the demand and supply of credit risk transfer. In Section 8 I dis-
cuss the role of hedge funds and investment banks as major 
players in the CRT markets, and in Section 9 I address the role 
of central banks, particularly their role as liquidity providers of 
last resort. Section 10 takes up some regulatory issues. Section 
11 gives a selective review of the academic literature on the 
economic effects of CRT. Section 12 summarizes the main ar-
guments discussed in this paper.  
 
A final remark: This paper reflects the state of the discussion 
and perception of issues as of June 2007, the date of the Con-
ference. This was well before the US mortgage crisis accentu-
ated and the role of central banks in supplying enormous 
amounts of liquidity has been debated. At least, the recent crisis 
provides some evidence that the issues and concerns dis-
cussed in this paper are not too detached from reality.  
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2. Credit risk transfer: Securitization and derivatives 
 
The enormous growth of the credit transfer (CRT) market has 
been widely discussed. CRT instruments include a wide variety 
of products and financing patters; all this together is often called 
“credit securitization”, but it is important to distinguish two types 
of products: 
 
• Structured credit products (true-sale securitization)1: such 
as Collateralized Debt Obligations (cash CDO), with CBO 
and CLO as special forms 
 
• Credit derivatives (synthetic securitization)2: such as Credit 
Default Swaps, Synthetic CDOs, Index Trades, Credit 
Linked Notes (CLN), Total Return Swaps (TRS), etc.; the 
Table of BBA provides details.  
 
The mechanics and variety of products can be found in e.g. BIS 
(2003), Franke (2005), Culp (2006), Mengle (2007), and else-
where. The major difference between the two groups is that 
CDOs represent a direct risk transfer while e.g. CDS is a con-
tractual (therefore, synthetic) risk transfer with the debt remain-
ing on the balance sheet of the bank.  
 
Market participants are either buying or selling protection; a 
buyer of protection receives cash flows in a respectively defined 
credit loss event, while the seller has to pay. It should be noted 
this terminology applies to forward type products (e.g. swaps, 
index trading) as well as option like instruments (e.g. credit 
spread options) – actual or synthetic.  
 
                                                 
1 Structured credit products transfer the credit risk associated with a portfolio of reference 
assets representing the collateral. They are mostly issued in several “tranches”: An equity 
tranche, mezzanine tranche, senior tranche, super-senior tranche, and others.  
 
2 Credit derivatives are instruments that transfer part or all of the credit risk of obligations 
(individual, pools) with no transfer of the legal ownership of the underlying asset. 
 5
Exhibit 1 displays the recent growth of the CRT market; notice 
that the CDOs are issued notional amounts, while credit deriva-
tives represent notional values outstanding. Obviously, they 
cannot be compared. As of the end of 2006, a notional amount 
of approximately 1000 bn US cash CDO was outstanding3.  
 
 
Exhibit 1 – The growth of the Credit Risk Transfer Markets: Cash CDOs and Credit 
Derivatives 
 
 CDO (cash)a 
(bn USD, issued 
notional) 
Credit Derivativesb (bn 
USD, notional out-
standing year-end) 
 
    
1996 NA 180 
1998 NA 350 
1999 NA 586 
2000 NA 893 
2001 NA 1’189 
2002 NA 1’952 
2003 NA 3’548 
2004 157 5’021 
2005 272 NA 
2006 549 20’207 
2008 (est.) 33’120 
a Source: SIFMA 
b Source: BBA (Britisch Bankers Association (2006) 
 
 
It is not the growth of the credit transfer market per se which 
gives raise to public concern, but issues related to the structure 
of the market (OTC), the diversity of products (liquidity, com-
plexity), the quality of the underlying risks, and the role and 
quality of the major counterparties (banks, insurance compa-
nies, hedge funds).  
 
A breakdown of the major credit derivatives can be found in the 
BBA survey; the most recent study lists 18 different products – 
compared to just have a dozens six years ago. The following 
table displays the major categories: 
 
                                                 
3 Source: CreditFluxData+ 
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Exhibit 2 Major Credit Derivatives 
 
Credit derivatives (narrow 
definition) 
 Relative share of 
total derivatives, as 
of 2000 
Relative share of 
total derivatives, as 
of 2006 
   
CDS single name 38.0% 33%
Basket products 6 2%
Full index trades PNA 30%
Tranched index trades PNA 8%
Synth CDO – fully funded PNA 4%
Synth CDO – partially funded PNA 13%
CLN 10% 3%
Cred Spr Opt 5% 1%
Equity linked PNA 0%
Swaptions PNA 1%
Others* 41% 6%
* asset swaps, portfolio CLOs, total return swaps 
PNA means that the product did not exist in 2000. 
Source: British Bankers Association (2006) 
 
 
For example, index trades were inexistent in 2000, while they 
represent 30% of the market share in 20064.  
 
We will discuss several of the structural characteristics later. 
Before, I would like to offer an economic framework to analyze 
risk and liquidity.  
 
 
3. Liquidity provision as selling put options 
 
The term “liquidity” has many faces, and the different usages of 
the term are hard to reconcile (see Zimmermann 2007 for ex-
amples). However – associating the creation of liquidity with 
selling put options has several advantages: it captures the fol-
lowing features: 
 
                                                 
4 It allows investors to take long and short views on credit events or spreads on a di-
versified basis, in a much more flexible way than by trading individual bonds. For in-
stance, with the TRAC-X contract gives an exposure to the 100 most liquid credit-
default swaps in North America, Europe, Asia, Japan and Australia. 
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- the availability of a numéraire asset, mostly cash (legal 
currency) 
- conditionality: the supply of liquidity conditional on bad 
economic states 
- commitment: the obligation to supply liquidity, condi-
tional upon the defined state, in exchange of an asset at 
specified conditions (exercise price, time horizon) 
- the synthetic nature of put options: replication by a dy-
namic strategy, equivalent to a stop-loss strategy with 
dynamically adjusted floor (cushion) 
 
To recapitulate, a short put option represents the commitment 
to buy a risky asset (or more generally: an underlying risk posi-
tion) at a specific underlying price within or at the end of a spe-
cific time period. “Selling” a put option can mean different 
things, depending on the institutional or contractual framework: 
 
If it is an effective option traded at an organized exchange, the  
liquidity provided by the short option writer is secured by the 
daily margin requirements of the exchange. Of course, the mar-
gin payments – and thus the liquidity provided by the seller –  
increase as the option gets more in the money.  
 
No such security exists for an OTC put option, so the availability 
of liquidity is exposed to counterparty risk. At best, the seller of 
the put option is hedged against the underlying risk, which is 
typically done by a dynamic strategy in the underlying risk asset 
(short) and the holding of cash (long). The mechanics is dis-
played with a numerical example in Exhibit 3 below.  
 
This makes it transparent why a short put option position is 
equivalent to a dynamic, liquidity providing strategy: the seller 
commits to buy the risky asset (in CRT: the credit risk) in the 
bad state, and does so by increasing its leverage. As we will 
see, this is the typical behavior of hedge funds: highly lever-
aged sellers of deep-out-of-the money put options. But are they, 
effectively, providers of liquidity? Unlike as for exchange-traded 
options, the hedge funds only behave as if they would short 
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puts. But effectively, they represent a counterparty risk for the 
long side of the transaction.  
As long as the underlying market is “liquid” and the risky asset 
can be easily traded, the put option hedge is safe and the “li-
quidity” provided by the put option seller works well. However, 
under certain circumstances, it may be difficult for the option 
seller to adjust the hedge position, and/or to get the required 
funding for the adjustment. So, while the “short put analogy” 
works well, it also raises the following question: who is effec-
tively providing the liquidity, given the leverage of the (replicat-
ing) position?  
 
 
Exhibit 3 Put options, and how they are synthetically replicated 
 
A) Short Put 
      Long put Short put
      (X=68) (X=68)
    
   [uu] 140 0 0
  [u] 120  
100   [ud][du]   96 0 0
  [d]   80  
   [dd]   64 +4 -4
 
B) Synthetic Short Put 
         
       [uu] -cash -0
      +asset +0
  [u] -cash -6 0   
-cash* -6  +asset +6 0 [ud][du] -cash -12
+asset +5   +asset +12
  [d] -cash -6 -12   
   +asset +4 +10 [dd] -cash -12
    +asset +8
*a short position in cash is a fixed-rate loan (here: interest rate = 0%) 
 
Explanation: Panel A displays a binomial (“up and down”) price process over two pe-
riods. Three possible prices occur at the end of the second period (64, 96, 140). The 
last two columns display the payoffs of a long and short put option with an exercise 
price of 68. Panel B shows how the value of the short put option (from Panel A) can 
be synthetically replicated with a long position in the underlying asset (positive sign) 
and a short position in cash (negative sign). The crucial point is the adjustment of the 
synthetic position after the first period: In the downstate, the long position in the asset 
must be increased (from 4 to 10), which is financed by an increase in leverage (from 
6 to 12).  
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4. Applications  
 
The earliest notion that selling put options can be regarded as 
equivalent to the provision of liquidity, comes from Grossman 
[1988] – although he does not use the term explicitly: Dynamic 
portfolio insurance strategies5 were often regarded as a major 
driving force behind the stock market crash in 1987, because 
many institutional investors without having access to “aggregate 
information” about the actual use of similar strategies tried to 
manage the downside risk of their portfolio by a synthetic (dy-
namic) strategy. However, unlike with using actual put options, 
the implementation and success of a dynamic strategy require 
assumptions about parameters on the underlying market (e.g. 
volatility) which are not necessarily consistent with equilibrium. 
Grossman shows that the “informational externalities” created 
by this behavior can destabilize markets, i.e. give raise to an 
unexpected liquidity shortage in the market reflected in sharpe 
price adjustments in the underlying market. Using actual put op-
tions can be understood as a market mechanism which “prices” 
the demand and supply of protection ex ante, with high put op-
tion prices giving an incentive to market participants to sell op-
tions (commit to buy shares) and thereby providing “liquidity”. 
 
The link to liquidity is more directly established by Scholes 
[2000] in discussing the LTCM liquidity crisis. The key argument 
which is of interest here is that hedge funds, such as LTCM, are 
explicitly regarded as providers (sellers, suppliers) of liquidity: 
 
LTCM was in the business of supplying liquidity at levels that were determined by its 
traders. In 1998, LTCM had large positions, concentrated in less liquid assets. As a re-
sult of the financial crisis, LTCM was forced to switch from being a large supplier to 
being a large demander of liquidity, at a cost that eliminated its capital. Scholes 
(2000), p. 17  
 
This was motivated – as the author claims – because the num-
ber of liquidity suppliers on capital markets sharply decreased in 
the nineties, motivating (unregulated, long term oriented) inves-
                                                 
5 not to be confused with “program trading” as an automated strategy implementing 
stock index arbitrage with futures contracts.  
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tors such as hedge funds to step in the market and earn a risk 
premium. 
 
During the last two years, the number of liquidity providers diminished. Many finan-
cial institutions that previously devoted part of their capital to earning returns by sup-
plying liquidity to the market withdrew from doing such or would only commit capital 
at much higher expected premiums. To provide liquidity, an investor must have a 
longer horizon than the average market participant. Scholes (2000), p. 17. 
 
The risk premium, however, was regarded as extremely low, 
forcing investors to highly leverage their investment in order to 
get a “fair” premium: 
 
Interestingly, because the liquidity premium is generally small relative lo the expected 
return on alternative investments, liquidity providers are generally leveraged investors 
that must hedge other factor exposures. Scholes (2000), p. 17. 
 
Of course, from a risk-return perspective, there is no reason for 
leverage at all (MM) – except in order to increase the expected 
rate of return.  
 
The presumption of liquidity premiums being small is theoreti-
cally implausible and empirically not supported by the data. 
First, if the institutions supplying liquidity to the market effec-
tively decreased over time, the premium should increase ceteris 
paribus. Indeed, a study of Pastor/ Stambaugh (2003) shows 
that the average liquidity premium (i.e. the average return 
spread between stocks with high sensitivities to liquidity and 
stocks with low sensitivities) is as high as 7.5% per annum over 
a 34-year period6; of course, this is not the market segment 
Scholes had in mind when discussing liquidity issues related to 
LTCM7. But at least in stock markets, liquidity risk is highly re-
warded.   
 
The important point for the subsequent discussion is that Scho-
les’ characterization of liquidity and hedge fund behaviour is not 
a matter of the past, but still provides a highly adequate picture 
                                                 
6 adjusted for exposures to the market return as well as size, value, and momentum factors. 
7 LTCM had illiquid foreign bond positions.  
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of the hedge fund industry today. The following quote is from a 
recent study of Dresdner Kleinwort on the hedge fund industry8: 
 
“A clear majority of hedge funds can be thought of as leveraged sellers of 
deep-out-of-the-money put options. They employ long-short strategies – re-
moving market risk with what are essentially spread or arbitrage bets with a 
relatively low return. To boost returns they employ extensive leverage. These 
spread positions do produce what look like low-risk returns most of the time — 
but, once in a blue moon, what are effectively options written by the hedge 
funds will get called. Think LTCM.” Dresdner Kleinwort “The Great Unwind is 
Coming”, February 2007 
 
 
The disturbing implication comes from the fact that hedge funds 
are heavily selling credit risk protection, and the leverage is 
substantially provided by investment banks – who in turn are 
becoming sellers of protection on their own. This will be illus-
trated below.  
 
                                                 
8 Unfortunately, the study is not publicly accessible. The subsequent quote can be found in several commentaries 
of the study.  
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5. The economic function of credit risk transfer 
 
The typical function of CRT is seen in an improved, or at least 
facilitated, allocation (dispersion) of credit risk among a wider 
spectrum of market participants using capital markets. Some-
time the function is characterized as transformation of “illiquid” 
balance sheet risk to “liquid” capital market risk.  
 
Some clarification is required. From a capital market perspec-
tive, one has to distinguish between risk diversification and risk 
transfer. CRT is both: part of the credit risk can be diversified 
with other risks investors (insurance companies, pension plans) 
are exposed to; but obviously, part of the risk is systematic and 
thus priced with a premium. This makes it attractive for active 
risk trading (speculation), depending on the size and time varia-
tion of the premium.  
 
In addition, essentially all CRT is allocated/ traded over-the-
counter (OTC), i.e. outside organized derivatives markets. 
Thus, much of the concerns discussed before (informational ex-
ternalities, lack of market prices) plus several operational prob-
lems are directly relevant here.  
 
Again, the discussion and analysis provided by Scholes [2000] 
is directly relevant for the CRT market. Two arguments are key: 
First, most potential providers of liquidity use static stress-loss 
limits which are know to be time-inconsistent; they should opti-
mally use dynamic stop-loss policies as e.g. implied by option 
replicating strategies.  
 
Second, most potential risk takers do not know how the market 
price of liquidity affects the pricing of their stress-limits, which 
creates wrong capital allocation incentives. As a consequence 
 
“because stress-loss cushions are static, entities have an ill-defined policy on 
when to supply and in what amounts. As a result, banks and financial entities 
are not the natural suppliers of liquidity….”  Scholes (2000), p. 20.  
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Whether these observations also apply to the current CRT prod-
ucts, is up for discussion. However, dynamic risk policies are 
virtually inexistent in, at least, the regulated financial sector, and 
reliable price information on the market price of liquidity is only 
imperfectly available. A recent market commentary claims: 
 
The financial markets now are full of much liquidity. Are investors, speculators 
and their bankers appreciating and pricing in liquidity risk? Toomre Capital 
Markets LLC would suggest that liquidity risk presently is greatly under-valued 
in the search for "alpha", absolute return and portfolio yield. Lars Toomre, 
Hedge Funds, Investment Banks and the Value of Liquidity? 12/02/2007 
 
This would require a centralized market for call and put options 
on credit risk with reliable price information. One might hope, as 
Scholes does, that  
 
The financial industry will become more creative in supplying or finding a 
source of supply of "liquidity" options and contingent capital to supply liquidity 
in times of stress. As the reinsurance market has developed for excess loss, 
similar markets could develop and add value in financial markets. This be-
comes an important role for alternative investments. Scholes (2000), p. 21. 
 
 
The analogy with the reinsurance market is particularly insight-
ful. It highlights the role of reinsurance companies as liquidity 
provides to the direct insurers. However, the statement may be 
too optimistic about the potential role of hedge funds, and other 
alternative (unregulated) investors about their role in providing 
this function.  
 
 
6. Exchange-traded credit derivatives? 
 
Organized trading (standardization) of credit risk is just in the 
early stages. Eurex launched the world’s first exchange-traded 
credit derivative contract, a futures based on the Itraxx Europe 
index, on March 27, 2007. It seeks to replicate the risk structure 
of CDS traded in the OTC market. To date, the success is how-
ever modest.  
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Plans in the US are under review at the SEC: CME announced 
plans to list a credit derivative future on 3 single name CDS; 
also, CBOE has plans to launch credit default options on about 
10 single names. As noted by Pool/ Mettler (2007), innovation is 
not expected to be substantial in a dealer dominated market 
structure like the US.  
 
Of course exchange-traded credit derivatives would solve many 
of the problems with respect to transparency, pricing, margin 
requirements, and obviously, many of the operational risks in-
herent in the current market structure. The latter risks are per-
ceived to be the most changeling ones by the major market par-
ticipants: 
 
Exhibit 4 The Challenges in CRT - as seen by the major market participants 
 
 Total Banks only
 
Settlement 22 18
Confirmations 17 14
Documentation 9 3
Liquidity 9 7
Pricing 8 4
Transparency 8 5
Accounting 6 3
Regulation 6 5
Systemic Risk 6 2
Tight Spreads 6 4
   
Fitch 2006, p.2 
 
The same finding emerges from the BAA survey, where “sys-
tems/ infrastructure is deemed to be the main drag on the mar-
ket” (p. 33).  
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7. Demand and supply of credit protection: Some recent 
figures 
 
The determinants of demand and supply of credit protection, 
their size and predictability, is of major importance for systemic 
stability. Two sources provide up-to-date information about this: 
FitchRatings (Fitch) in their annual Global Credit Derivatives 
Survey, and the annual Credit Derivatives Report released by 
the British Bankers Association (BBA).  
  
The 2006 Fitch report is based on a survey of 75 major institu-
tions worldwide, with data/ information as of 2005. Among the 
most important findings are: 
 
• From the reported institutions, there is a net difference be-
tween protection buyers and sellers of 377 bn USD. This 
gap reflects the presence of institutions not captured by 
the survey, namely hedge funds, pension funds, asset 
management companies.  
 
 
Exhibit 5 Credit Protection Buyers and Sellers 
 
 Protection 
buyer 
Protection 
seller 
Gap  
2004 Major:  
Banks: 427 bn 
Major: 
??? 
128 bn  
2006 Major: 
Banks: 268 bn 
Major: 
Insurance/ Fin 
Gurant: 645 bn
377 bn  
Fitch 2006, notional amounts, USD 
 
 
• Banks: On a global basis, banks are still net buyers of pro-
tection (268 bn). However, many large European banks 
moved from net buyers to flat or even protection sellers 
(Fitch, p. 2); this shift is triggered particularly by three 
globally large UK and Swiss banks. The reason is seen in 
the growing importance of trading/market making, and the 
usage of credit derivatives for yield enhancement strate-
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gies, instead of classical hedging loan portfolios. This is 
also reflected in the following Table, adapted from BBA, 
which confirms that market making/trading is the prime 
motivating factor driving the usage of credit derivatives. 
The management of credit lines or of regulatory/ economic 
capital are relatively unimportant.  
 
 
Exhibit 6 Usage of credit derivatives: Main motivation 
 
  2002 - Rank 2006 – Rank 
    
Trading/ market making  1 1 
Product structuring  4 2 
Hedging trading instruments  6 3 
Active portfolio/ asset mgmt  5 4 
Mgmt individual credit lines  2 5 
Mgmt of regulatory capital  3 6 
Mgmt of economic capital  7 7 
Source: BBA 2006 
 
 
• Insurers/reinsurers plus financial guarantors sold protec-
tion amounting 645 bn USD9. On a net basis, credit deriva-
tives are mainly used as alternative investments vehicles – 
not for trading purposes, or market making. Interestingly, 
in terms of quality, 91% of the protection (sold by insurers) 
is in the AAA segment! These structural characteristics are 
in sharp contrast to the usage in banks or hedge funds. 
 
• Counterparty concentration. Fitch reports that 86% of the 
trading volume (and 66% of the total exposure10) concen-
trates on the top 10 market makers. UBS is among the top 
5 counterparties, and exhibits the best rating (AA plus)11. 
This concentration  
 
                                                 
9 Notice that the figures are largely determined by AIG Financial Products’ dominating activities in this market 
segment, which accounts for about 70% of the global net sold exposures.  
10 This figure is based on a purely count basis, i.e. how many times an institution was cited, and it thus an imper-
fect estimate of the economic exposure.  
11 Morgan Stanley AA-, Deutsche Bank AA-, Goldman Sachs AA-, JPMorgan Case A+.  
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“… raises concerns about liquidity being maintained in the event one of these 
banks exiting the market either for idiosyncratic or exogeneous reasons” (p. 7). 
 
“… heightens the potential for liquidity disruptions across the industry. For ex-
ample, the market could be susceptible to a sharp unwinding or de-leveraging 
of positions across multiple firms” (p. 8). 
 
 
The major shift in market participation over the past few years is 
the increased role of non-bank institutions, non-regulated insti-
tutions, particularly hedge funds. This comes clearly out from 
the following table adapted from the BBA-survey: 
 
Exhibit 7 Credit derivatives, shares of protection bought and sold 
 
2006   Buyers of pro-
tection 
Sellers of pro-
tection 
Net  
       
Banks incl. securi-
ties firms 
  59% 44% +15%  
 Trading  (39%) (35%) (+4%)  
 Loan portfolio  (20%) (9%) (+11%)  
Insurers   6% 17% -11%  
 Reinsurance  (2%) (4%) (-2%)  
Hedge Funds   28% 32% -4%  
Pension funds   2% 4% -2%  
Mutual funds   2% 3% -1%  
Corporates   2% 1% +1%  
Other   1% 1% 0%  
Total   100% 100% 0%  
Source: British Bankers Association (2006) 
 
Apparently, hedge funds clearly dominate insurers as sellers of 
protection (32% vs. 17%). However, on a net basis, insurers are 
still the largest sellers of protection (-11%), compared to hedge 
funds (-4%). Interestingly, the net position of reinsurers has the 
same sign (net seller), and only accounts for a small fraction of 
the net overall position (-2%). The figures corresponds to the 
net position taken by pension funds (-2%).  
 
Apparently, the role of hedge funds is particularly important. 
The following observations are revealing (Fitch 2005, Fitch 
2006):  
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• Hedge fund trading activity in credit derivatives is esti-
mated at 20-30% of the global volume (which is lower than 
the 50% estimated by Greenwich Assoc.). 
 
• Demand for higher yielding instruments increased in the 
past years. One third (!) of the protection sold in 2005 is in 
the speculative grade or unrated segment. Hedge funds 
particularly sell protection for below-investment grade 
credits (p. 2). Explicitly,  
 
“some hedge funds now play a critical role in financing the least liquid, highest 
yielding subordinated tranches of transactions” (Fitch 2005, p. 4). 
 
This observation has strong implications for role of rating 
agencies, both with respect to risk management and pric-
ing, and finally, regulatory treatment of hedge funds as 
counterparties of regulated institutions.  
 
 
8. The Role of Hedge Funds and Investment Banks 
 
The link between banks and hedge funds (HFs) needs some 
analysis12. Apparently, the large banks face not only a substan-
tial counterparty risk vis-à-vis HFs, but there is also a strong 
economic dependence with respect to the profitability of the HF 
industry as a whole. This relationship largely depends on the 
prime brokerage business, which is a package of services of-
fered by investment banks to hedge funds: it includes financing 
services (leverage of HFs’ assets), securities lending, trading, 
global custody services, operational support, consolidated cash 
management, risk management advisory and other services. 
The apparent advantage of using a prime broker for a hedge 
fund is the ability to keep trading relationship with multiple bro-
kers while maintaining, in a centralized master account at their 
prime broker, the hedge fund’s cash and securities/ collateral.   
 
                                                 
12 A detailed analysis of these issues is provided by Cole/ Feldberg/ Lynch (2007).  
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For the investment banks, the income generated through prime 
brokerage for hedge funds is substantial. According to various 
sources (see Mustier/ Dubois 2007 for a summary of the follow-
ing figures), hedge funds generated as of 2005 
 
• 40% of total equities trading revenues of investments 
banks, 20% of total fixed income trading revenues, and 
80% of trading in distressed debt markets;  
 
• USD 25.8 bn (or approx. 25%) revenues, of which 8.8 bn 
(35%) comes from prime brokerage. A detailed breakdown 
of the revenues is displayed in Exhibit 8. 
 
 
Exhibit 8 Investment Banks Revenues generated by HFs: Estimates 2005 
 
     
Total esti-
mated reve-
nues 
   25.8 
Of which… Sales and 
trading 
  17.0
 Prime broker-
age 
  8.8
 Of which… Clearing and 
custody 
 1.2
  Trading and 
execution 
 3.4
  Financing  4.2
  Of which … Sec. Lending 3.3
   Margin Lending 0.9
Various sources (see e.g. Mustier/ Dubois 2007) 
 
Unfortunately, I found no figures showing the revenue share 
generated by credit derivatives, specifically.  
 
However, in order to understand the potential risks emerging 
from the relationship between the banking sector and HFs, it is 
important to recognize that the most important source of income 
comes from the financing/ lending activities. Financing and 
lending fees are charged in bps of the value of loans to/ depos-
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its from HFs, securities lending (short sales), and synthetic fi-
nancing products.  
 
As a consequence, HFs with substantial short-selling and lever-
age create the most lucrative income opportunities for invest-
ment banks. The implied incentives for the banks are obvious. 
For the HFs, this behavior is highly attractive because it allows 
to leverage-up the tight credit spreads having emerged in this 
highly competitive market.   
 
Of course, the lending to HFs is secured by margins or collat-
erals, but this (at least the latter) merely shifts the counterparty 
(credit) risk to market risk, and the problem is that the condi-
tional value of collaterals in bad states is difficult to assess ex 
ante. 
 
In our earlier interpretation, the option of HFs to shift their obli-
gation away to the sponsoring banks implies that not the HF in-
dustry but rather the banking sector is effectively selling liquid-
ity. However, as in dynamic portfolio insurance – the real (equi-
librium) cost of insurance (liquidity) is not reflected in market 
prices – it can just estimated. But maybe that the estimate is 
way too low, and as in the case of LTCM in the statement of 
Scholes, the banks learn about the effective costs only after a 
shock to the system occurs. 
 
The systemic implications of all that have now been recognized 
and lead to some concern; for example: 
 
In effect, risks that, in theory, have been dispersed throughout the capital markets 
via disintermediation may, in fact, have become reconcentrated by some hedge 
funds.” (Fitch 2005).  
 
A recent study by Dresdner Kleinwort reaches similar conclu-
sions: 
 
While hedge fund strategies across the industry may look diversified, there is ac-
tually a high degree of correlation, since many funds are effectively running lever-
aged bets on stable or tightening risk premia. Any widening of risk premia will 
force large-scale liquidations of positions, with margin calls by the banks and re-
demptions by investors reinforcing the process. (Dresdner Kleinwort 2007) 
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Of course, the potential systemic risk of credit derivatives is not 
limited to the bank-HFs relationship, but should include the role 
of re/insurance companies as sellers of protection as well: their 
hedging behavior, liquidity management strategies, and so on.  
 
The systemic risk implied by credit derivatives is discussed in a 
series of theoretical papers (see the final section of this paper). 
A particularly interesting study (Allen/ Carletti 2006) investigates 
the contagion effects if banks and insurance companies issue 
credit derivatives and hold the same assets (collateral) as a 
hedge against liquidity risk – although for different reasons. 
Contagion occurs because there are states of nature where 
banks and insurance companies have to liquidate the collateral 
simultaneously. So, although the credit derivative improves the 
allocation of risk, it creates a potential systemic risk. The overall 
welfare effect is not easy to determine in general.  
 
So, the conclusions are in line with the informal reasoning of the 
previously quoted concerns.  
 
 
9. Key Issue: The Role of Central Banks 
 
In my view, the biggest liquidity risk emerging from the CRT 
market is concentrated with the big banks: this is related,  
 
- on the one hand, to their own trading positions, and  
 
- on the other hand, to the various HF activities, based on which 
they face a substantial counterparty or liquidity risk related to 
the holding of client’s collaterals, but also because their earn-
ings increasingly depend on the performance and profitability of 
the HF industry.  
 
But of course, the banks hedge the liquidity risks in various 
ways, and the key role is the role of collateral trading in their 
daily liquidity management. The role of the central bank(s) is 
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crucial in this process13. Collateral trading provides access to 
contingent sources of liquidity at pre-announced terms, which is 
– apparently again – a sale of put options on the part of central 
banks. The monetary authority provides legal currency in ex-
change of a defined pool of “eligible” assets. Having access to 
standing facilities may help to stabilize markets exactly as in the 
portfolio insurance example, because it prevents the unex-
pected and uncoordinated sale of assets in periods of market 
disruption. Peaks in liquidity are likely to increase in the future, 
due to the emergence of complex international payment and 
settlement systems (e.g. CLS in the forex area). 
 
The crucial question now is how the range of eligible assets is 
defined. For internationally active banks, restricting the pool to 
domestic assets (debt) is definitively too tight, and the direct ac-
cess to central banks in other jurisdiction is operationally and 
legally restricted. So, the definition of an adequate, broad-
enough “pool” of pledgeable assets is of prime importance (see 
Exhibit … for some evidence on this). However, no common 
approach to liquidity standards exists among central banks.  
 
Even more importantly, in order to facilitate the cross-border li-
quidity management of global banks, ways should be estab-
lished to pledge domestic collateral to a central bank in a differ-
ent country. This requires the implementation of “routine” (as 
opposed to exceptional) cross-border collateral arrangements 
between the major central banks. For instance 
 
For example, the Bank of England routinely employs such arrangements to 
accept euro-denominated government securities as collateral for sterling li-
quidity, and also stands ready to accept US Treasuries in exceptional circum-
stances. (Bank of England 2007), p. 52, italics by the author.  
 
Establishing cross-border collateral arrangements would pro-
vide indeed an “efficient liquidity bridge across markets” (BIS-
CPSS, 2006, p. 16).  
 
                                                 
13 an up-to-date discussion of these issues can be found in the 2007 Financial Stability Report of the Bank of 
England. 
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However, the current practice is still far away from that. An in-
depth analysis of the practices and procedures used by interna-
tional banks in their liquidity and collateral management is pro-
vided by a Working Group of the BIS Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems (CPSS), reviewing the practices of 30 
international banks in the G10 countries; see Figure 1 von p. 
12. The study reveals that only a small minority of banks (2!) 
have actually implemented a globally integrated, centralized 
basis with a direct access to foreign markets (so called self-
clearing). Interestingly, several banks even argue that they pre-
fer decentralized liquidity and collateral management, “ensuring 
diversification of collateral/liquidity holdings/sources in the event 
of an emergency” (p. 11). There is, obviously, a tradeoff be-
tween efficiency and systemic safety which is difficult to bal-
ance.  
 
 
Overall, the extent to which major investment banks faces col-
lateral constraints in their global liquidity management, and the 
degree to which these may be mitigated by a more efficient 
cross-border use of collateral, becomes an increasingly impor-
tant topic in the future: the risk allocation and liquidity effects of 
credit derivatives and the de/stabilizing role of hedge funds cru-
cially depends on the liquidity provision of the monetary authori-
ties, i.e. their willingness to write put options on a pool of as-
sets. More effort is necessary to keep up with the dramatic 
growth of these complex markets.  
 
 
Exhibit 9 The impact of central bank eligible collateral: Average daily usage, in % 
of outstanding collateral, to meet banks’ demand for central bank liquidity 
 
  Domestic 
debt only 
 Total eligi-
ble assets 
 
      
Sweden  11% < 1.0%  
Switzerland  15% 1.0%  
UK  30% 3.5%  
Source: BIS 2006 (Bank of International Settlements BIS, 2006, Cross-border collat-
eral arrangements), p. 9 
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10. Regulatory actions? 
 
Regulators, monetary authorities, financial stabilizators, and 
academics have become well aware of the issues discussed 
before. However, much of the discussion is still concerned 
about market discipline, disclosure and transparency, stress 
testing and the like (see Weber 2007, Cole/Feldberg/Lynch 
2007 and other contributions in the same volume). For instance, 
the Swiss National Bank (see Hildebrand 2007), in its “best-
practice proposal”, aims at strengthening the credit relationship 
between prime-brokers and hedge funds, and suggests to take 
stress tests and liquidity risk seriously.  
 
“The underlying liquidity profile of hedge funds should be an important ele-
ment in conducting stress tests and margin call simulations as well as in de-
termining margin call procedures under adverse market conditions.” 
Hildebrand (2007) 
 
However, the concern of Myron Scholes still applies, namely 
that stress tests remain a “dry run” as long as they are not 
priced with market data: the relevant question is how the market 
price of liquidity affects the pricing of their stress-limits, or what 
it would cost for the banks to buy excess loss (re)insurance for 
these limits.  
 
Perhaps the analogy of a liquidity crisis with traffic jam may help 
more to clarify the point (see Zimmermann 2007). The question 
is whether a traffic jam (say, on a highway) is the consequence 
of 
 
• insufficient capacity? (need for more lines, more high-
ways)  
 
• insufficient advance information (transparency)? (every-
body using GPS) 
 
• insufficient coordination! Coordination can be improved by 
a. regulatory action (harmonization of behavior): Break 
lights, minimum distance, speed range, …  
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b. market structure design: order systems, settlement sys-
tems, financial instruments, etc. aggregating individual 
plans and expectations and thereby providing due-time 
information about prospective market imbalances and 
traffic jam in the financial system.   
 
Markets are typically regarded as an extremely efficient mecha-
nism to coordinate decisions: This is the old claim by Hayek 
(1945), that prices help individuals making informative decisions 
in spite of their limited overall information about the structure of 
the economic system. 
 
What is operationally difficult for roads (real-time road-pricing) is 
much easier for financial markets: Liquidity, in principle, can be 
easily priced, even real-time; we just need appropriate instru-
ments, organized exchanges and efficient infrastructures (for a 
conceptual proposal, see Black 1995).  
 
Summing up: 
 
• It’s not the extent of CRT per se, as often claimed, which 
causes liquidity related systemic risk, but rather the poten-
tial coordination failures of the behavior market partici-
pants.  
 
• Coordination issues are, to a large extent, a matter of mar-
ket structure; thus regulatory actions aimed at improving 
liquidity should focus on the architecture of the financial 
system, not so much on the behavior of individual agents 
(such as the Basel II capital standards)14.  
 
• Market stabilization should therefore be understood as a 
process of establishing informative markets and adequate 
infrastructure. 
 
                                                 
14 See Eichenberger/Summer (2005) for a similar argument: “If regulation aims at the risk allocation in the entire 
banking system, then it has to depart from concentrating on individual bank balance sheets. (…) A system ap-
proach to banking regulation is the beginning” (p. 24). 
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11. A selective literature review on CRT 
 
There is not a vast literature analyzing the role of credit deriva-
tives in a broader economic setting. There are only a few mod-
els, and even less empirical work. In this section I shortly review 
several papers which I find particularly interesting. Of course, 
this review is far from complete.  
 
Allen/ Carletti (2006) develop a model with a banking and in-
surance sector; they demonstrate that if banks face idiosyn-
cratic (heterogeneous) liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an in-
terbank market, CRT can be welfare reducing. “It can lead to 
contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of 
crises.” In the model, both banks and insurance companies use 
the same asset (called a long term asset) as hedge: the banks 
as hedge against idiosynchratic liquidity risk, and insurance 
companies as hedge against CRT (i.e. the credit risk they buy 
from the banks). If insurance companies earn insufficient pre-
mia to cover firms’ losses, they have to sell the long asset at a 
discount, which in turn deteriorates the value of the banks’ 
hedge against liquidity risk. So banks may suffer liquidity risk 
and bankrupt. The model is slightly superficial and does not re-
late well to the real world of CRT. At least, some interesting re-
marks can be found at the end of the paper (see the quotes C3 
and C4 in the Appendix).  
 
Morrison (2005) demonstrates that CRT destroys the signalling 
role of bank debt, and thus, leads to an overall reduction in wel-
fare. Whether disclosure requirements for credit derivatives are 
sufficient to help to offset this effect (as suggested) is question-
able.  
 
Parlour/ Plantin (2005) analyze adverse selection problems as-
sociated with CRT. While providing more flexibility for banks to 
recycle capital, CRT markets “may also reduce a bank’s incen-
tive to monitor as it could also sell non–performing loans. The 
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impact of the credit risk transfer market on banks and capital 
markets depends on this tradeoff between a lower monitoring 
incentive and the increased flexibility offered by a liquid market.” 
Therefore, CRT is socially efficient ex post (i.e. given that it ex-
ists), but not necessarily ex ante.  
 
Wagner (2005) shows that enhanced diversification of credit 
risk exhibits a trade-off: while reducing each institution’s individ-
ual probability of default, banks could be induced to increase 
their investment in risky assets at the cost of their liquidity hold-
ing, which can increase the probability of a liquidity-based crisis.  
 
Duffee/ Zhou (2001) argue that while credit derivatives may im-
prove capital allocation for banks, the overall effect can be 
negative because other risk sharing markets, such as direct 
loan sales, can potentially break down: if banks use credit de-
rivatives to sell part their loan portfolio, this could alter investors’ 
expectations about the loan quality sold in the loan-sale market, 
worsening the adverse selection problem to such an extent that 
it collapses.  
 
On the empirical side, Goderis/ Marsh/ Vall Castello/ Wagner 
(2006) find that banks issuing CDOs (at least once) experience 
a permanent increase in their target loan levels of around 50%.  
 
Krahnen/ Wilde (2006) investigate the impact to credit securiti-
zation (CDOs) on the cyclicality of banks, as measure by banks’ 
equity returns. Modelling the subordination of tranches and the 
capital structure of banks, they find that the banks’ systematic 
risk tends to increase.  
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12. Conclusions 
 
I would like to summarize the major insights of this memoran-
dum as follows: 
 
1) In principle, credit risk transfer (CRT) facilitates the distri-
bution of credit risk. We argue that selling CRT protection 
is equivalent to improving the liquidity of the financial sys-
tem. It’s like selling portfolio insurance. 
 
2) In terms of the overall financial disintermediation process 
being accelerated with the CRT markets, one should dif-
ferentiate between capacity effects (e.g. infrastructure, 
market making), information effects (e.g. transparency, 
disclosure, adverse selection), and coordination. The fo-
cus of my analysis is on the latter.  
 
3) Hedge funds take increasingly the role of protection sellers 
in this market; they can be characterized as highly lever-
aged sellers of deep out-of the money puts. But this is not 
done through actual put options (firm commitment, mar-
gins), but synthetically. Therefore their commitment is 
questionable – apparently (as revealed by the Scholes 
quote), they easily shift from providing to demanding pro-
tection in the relevant state of nature. The Scholes quote 
refers to a market environment without the huge credit de-
rivatives market. The question is whether the market struc-
ture, in terms of demand and supply of liquidity, is more 
stable today.  
 
Under these circumstances, given that the entire CRT 
market operates over-the-counter, it is difficult to find out 
“who is doing what” in a market disruption. Therefore, the 
role of hedge funds in providing “liquidity” is questionable.  
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4) So the key issue becomes who is providing the “liquidity” 
to the hedge funds. The Prime Brokerage Business of in-
vestment banks facilitates leveraging the funds, primarily 
through margin and securities lending. To the extent that 
investment banks provide the capital, they are effectively 
the protection sellers. Therefore the key question is how 
the banks manage their own liquidity risk.  
 
5) As further observation, the trading departments of invest-
ments banks increasingly sell credit protection on their 
own.  
 
6) A natural question arising from all this is the role of central 
banks as “liquidity providers of last resort”; they do this by 
selling put option to the banks, called collateralized trad-
ing. This provides the major banks of a jurisdiction access 
to contingent sources of liquidity at pre-announced terms. 
The critical question is, however, how much they should 
commit, and how they evaluate the value of collaterals. In 
particular, across currencies (jurisdictions?), collateralized 
trading is still restricted, although arrangements between 
central banks are being developed (or at least, discussed) 
to improve the cross-border use of collateral. But still, this 
is in my view a key liquidity constraint of the financial sys-
tem.  
 
7) There are many open questions: What is the systemic im-
pact of ratings, of the rating industry? What is the role of 
the insurance/ reinsurance industry as liquidity providers? 
 
8) The overall conclusion of this paper is, that it is not the ex-
tent of CRT per se, as often claimed, which causes liquid-
ity related systemic risk, but rather the potential coordina-
tion failures of the behavior market participants in adverse 
market environments.  
 
9) Coordination issues are, to a large extent, a matter of 
market structure; thus regulatory actions to improve liquid-
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ity should focus on the architecture of the financial system 
in the first place, not so much on the behavior of individual 
agents. Market stabilization should therefore be under-
stood as a process of establishing informative markets and 
adequate infrastructure: CRT products, particularly op-
tions, should be traded at derivatives exchanges, so that 
selling protection is transparent, both in terms of counter-
party risk and pricing (adequate margins, daily settlement).  
 
10) The regulator’s agenda in the post-Basel II era should 
therefore include a conceptual framework to analyze li-
quidity issues in a broad, but unified context, including all 
major financial intermediaries (including central banks, 
re/insurance, hedge funds, pension funds, clearing organi-
zations, etc.). 
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Appendix:  
The current discussion about credit securitization, credit deriva-
tives, hedge funds, and liquidity 
 
 
 
In this appendix, we list several quotes related to our discussion 
in the text.  
 
 
A) Public discussion, newspapers, rating agencies, and market 
commentaries 
 
A1) David Roche, of Independent Strategy, argues that derivatives have created a 
form of liquidity outside the control of central bankers. “It is pretty obvious that if one 
can buy a security that represents an asset for 3-5% of its value, an awful lot of li-
quidity has been freed up,” he says. Economist, April 19th, 2007 “At the risky end of  
finance” 
 
A2) Credit has a paradoxical effect on stability. Although debt and leverage raise the 
level of risk, credit provides the markets with liquidity that serves to dampen volatility. 
(…)  Edward Chancellor, Ponzi nation, 2/7/2007 
 
A3) In Fitch’s opinion, potential ratings volatility would be felt most in the high yield 
sector and among borderline investment grade companies due to their sensitivity to 
liquidity access and refinancing risk. The timing of such a liquidity event would be a 
determinant factor. Fitch, Hedge Funds: An Emerging Force in the Global Credit 
Markets, 2005, p. 7 
 
A4) The relative concentration of market makers and counterparties also heightens 
the potential for liquidity disruptions across the industry. For example, the market 
could be susceptible to a sharp unwinding or de-leveraging of positions across multi-
ple firms. Fitch, Gloval Credit Derivatives Survey, 2006, p. 7-8 
 
 
 
B) IMF, BIS, Central Banks 
 
B1) With the growth of hedge funds, banks and other buyers of credit protection have 
realized a much greater ability to transfer credit risk, particularly the sale of equity or 
“first loss” tranches. These developments have also improved liquidity in credit de-
rivative markets in recent years. IMF (2006), p. 56 
 
B2) However, once transferred, secondary market liquidity risks and related 
contagion effects remain, and may constitute the most significant stability risk ema-
nating from the structured credit markets. Evaluating, managing, and ultimately re-
ducing liquidity risk is a key challenge for investors, as well as for supervisors and 
other public officials concerned with financial stability. IMF (2006), p. 66 
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B3) In such markets [if there is a lack of diversity among market participants], actual 
liquidity tends to fall well short of perceived or anticipated liquidity, and can lead to 
more volatile markets, liquidity disruptions, and price gapping. Increasing the diversity 
of market participants is important to maintain two-way flows and relatively stable 
liquidity conditions. IMF (2006), p. 66  
 
B4) Liquidity risk might also become more important, created either by contingent 
liabilities within securitisation structures or by increased dependence on these trans-
actions as a funding device. These risks are more difficult to measure than credit and 
market risk, and it may be difficult to deal with them in quantitative capital rules and 
disclosure standards. Bank for International Settlements (2003), p. 28.  
 
B5) The main concern with regard to financial stability is that failures of one or more 
larger hedge funds might jeopardise the stability of major complex financial institu-
tions and/or create market liquidity crises. Weber, Deutsche Bundesbank (2007) 
 
 
 
C) Academic papers 
 
C1) The result has been that credit has gradually changed from an illiquid risk that 
was not considered suitable for trading to a risk that can be traded much the same as 
others. (…) Hedge funds use credit derivatives in a variety of ways, all of which tend 
to augment market efficiency and price discovery as well as to increase liquidity. 
Mengle (2007) 
 
C2) With some qualifications, our analysis may hence also apply to other financial 
institutions, such, for example, insurance companies or hedge funds. Their failure 
induces similar costs, for instance because assets can only be liquidated at an infe-
rior price. Moreover, they are also likely to suffer from being in a crisis jointly. For ex-
ample, because they rely on a common pool of liquidity they may find it more difficult 
to liquidate assets at a fair price (as in our setup) or to borrow funds in crisis times. 
Wagner (2005), Diversification, no date 
 
C3) The interaction of incomplete markets and the role of liquidity in asset pricing are 
the key factors for the contagion across sectors. These elements can occur in the 
context of many financial institutions. Hedge funds have become increasingly impor-
tant in many markets. They potentially provide a conduit for contagion across many 
illiquid markets. Allen/ Carletti (2006), p. 110 
 
C4) This paper has focused on the private provision of liquidity in markets and has 
not analyzed the role of central banks in liquidity provision. In markets with limited 
participation it is likely that central banks will have problems injecting liquidity into the 
financial system that will reach the required markets and prevent the kind of conta-
gion considered here. Allen/ Carletti (2006), p. 110 
 
C5) However, a liquid CRT market may also reduce a bank’s incentive to monitor as 
it could also sell non–performing loans. The impact of the credit risk transfer market 
on banks and capital markets depends on this tradeoff between a lower monitoring 
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incentive and the increased flexibility offered by a liquid market. Parlour/ Plantin 
(2005) 
 
C6) The secondary market for customized CDOs is nonexistent. One potential con-
cern is that some participants in credit derivatives markets may overestimate the li-
quidity of these products in constructing and hedging their correlation based portfo-
lios. The issue is not whether occasional losses are sustained by well-diversified 
large investors, but rather that one of the key player’s portfolios may be too highly 
concentrated in these instruments. While CDS indices have a certain level of liquidity 
due to their standard nature, they are not perfect hedges, and thus give rise to basis 
risk. Chan-Lau/ Ong (2006) 
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